Natural disasters requiring travel to safety include hurricanes, wildfires, floods, earthquakes, and tsunamis. Computational models and agent-based simulations of disaster evacuation and travel behavior have been developed to help disaster planners; however, these models may entail unrealistic assumptions regarding uniform human behavior. Many of these models assume people travel immediately after a disaster notification and that people travel straight out of the area likely to be affected. The present study provides two examples from Christchurch, New Zealand: a small scale but detailed measure of travel behavior after a real tsunami warning was issued and a larger scale study of self-report of considerations of leaving the city after a major local earthquake. In the tsunami study, 15% of the people actually moved towards the tsunami risk zones, not away. In the second study only 11.7% of the 206 people surveyed indicated thinking of leaving the city and they were significantly more likely to be female and high in trait neuroticism. Individual differences in responses to natural disasters need to be considered in disaster travel models.
INTRODUCTION
Natural disasters requiring evacuation include hurricanes, cyclones, floods, earthquakes, wildfires, and tsunamis. Disaster planners and managers are interested in modeling how people evacuate or travel during disasters, in order to properly plan for these events. A number of computational models and simulations using agent-based models have been developed to predict evacuation and disaster travel. These models require certain assumptions, often dubiously made, regarding how people behave when issued warnings or evacuation orders (Lindell & Parter, 2007) . A simulation, for example, by Chien and Korikanthimath (2007) assumes people will perfectly comply with evacuation orders and move when they are expressly instructed. Most models assume people travel immediately after a disaster notification and that people travel straight out of the region of disaster impact.
While the media often propagates the myth that people act irrationally or panic during disasters, this has proven to have little support (Walters & Hornig, 1993) . Indeed, people seem fairly resilient to disasters and behave cogently and orderly (Hiroi, Mikami, & Miyata, 1985; Quarantelli & Dybnes, 1976; Mileti & Nigg, 1984) . In a study examining the accuracy of intentions to evacuate during a hurricane event, researchers discovered a high degree of agreement between people's prior intentions and actual response during hurricanes (Kang et al., 2007) . Nevertheless, while people do not appear to act irrationally or in a panic, they do act in their own interest and individuals do differ, which is often overlooked in disaster and evacuation traffic simulations (Walton & Lamb, 2009) . Acting in one's own interest often entails either ensuring directly one's interests are taken care of (not relying on government authorities), or gathering information for one-self firsthand about the disaster event. Likewise, those likely to be anxious or high in trait neuroticism may be more likely to self-evacuate than others. Drabek (1969) noted in response to a flood evacuation that thousands of people who reported not being content with news coverage provided by radio and television traveled to the flood event to gather first-hand information about the event. These people were seeking information about the flood event first hand (disastersightseeing). Moreover, Drabek also noted that some people would drive into the impacted area to extract friends and family members, not trusting authorities with this task. People react to personally ensure their interests are being satisfied. Indeed, in a recent study simulating an earthquake event, Walton and Lamb (2009) demonstrated that some people intend to travel extensively after an earthquake event, despite being advised to stay at home and instructed by New Zealand's Civil Defense to stay off roads unless absolutely necessary. Indeed, 16% of the people in their study expressed interest in traveling to gather information about property damage, how friends and family are doing, and the event itself (e.g. disaster-sightseeing). While individually rational, this collective behavior can appear disorderly or chaotic. Individuals traveling to gather information may, in some cases, put unnecessary demands on the transportation network. On the other hand, people differ in their tolerance for risk. Some individuals may be more inclined to retreat from natural disasters than others.
Greater understanding of people's movements and the reasons for those movements is required to create more realistic models of disaster travel behavior. The present report will highlight (1) a small scale study in which travel behavior after a tsunami warning was recorded and (2) the relationship between trait personality and self-reported intentions to leave Christchurch after a major local earthquake.
CASE STUDY 1
Tsunamis pose a risk to many low-lying coastal regions. On February 27, 2010, an 8.7 magnitude earthquake (one of the largest on record) occurred off the coast of Chile. This earthquake generated a devastating local tsunami which damaged the port of Talcahuano. Due to this event tsunami warnings were issued in 53 countries, including New Zealand. Indeed, New Zealand's Civil Defense issued a warning a 1:30 NZ time, on Sunday February 28. A tsunami generated by a coastal South American earthquake was predicted to reach the eastern coast of New Zealand in 12-14 hours. Citizens of the city of Christchurch were warned and in particular coastal zones considered at risk were told to be ready in case an evacuation order was issued. In the end, no evacuation order was actually issued, partially due to the fortunate circumstance that the tsunami reached Christchurch at low tide.
This event provided the opportunity to trial a technique for recording and measuring a person's travel behavior when issued a warning of a tsunami event. In this study, twenty people shortly after the event, within 7 days, were asked to record and trace their travel behavior on a map of the Christchurch region for the day of the tsunami event (New Zealand Sunday February 28). The participants were also asked to answer some questions regarding the perceived risk of tsunamis and their knowledge regarding tsunamis. The public behavior ideal desired by disaster managers and Civil Defence would have been for people outside plausible risk zones to stay where they were and not travel. For those in coastal areas at risk they should, despite no official evacuation order, orderly self-evacuate or prepare for possible orderly evacuation. As discussed previously, simulations of evacuations often assume people will comply with these desired ideals. Nevertheless, as reported by the local media sources not all people in Christchurch complied with these ideals. Indeed, large numbers of people residing outside the high risk costal areas actually traveled to these high risk areas.
Twenty university students participated as volunteers. Due to the unpredictable nature of the event and the need to trial the mapping technique as soon after the event as possible to ensure the chances of correct recall of travel activities, the participants were a convenient sample. Of the 20 participants in the study 16 were women and 4 were men. The average age of the participants was 24.0 years (SD = 5.2), ranging from 20 to 39 years. The participants were asked to fill out a questionnaire. Items measured general tsunami and hazard knowledge for the city of Christchurch, assessed knowledge of warning systems and preparation, how the participant became aware of the tsunami event, and the participant's perceived risk of tsunamis. In addition, the participants were provided with a map of the city of Christchurch. The participants were asked to trace with a pencil their travel route for the day of the tsunami event (e.g. Sunday February 28 th ) and provide detailed notes regarded where they went and the approximate time of the trip. This mapping technique was the main focus of the study. The questionnaires took approximately 30 minutes -1 hour, for each participant to complete.
The primary result of interest was how many of the participants reported having traveled into zones which would have been evacuated in the case of a substantial tsunami event. These areas had been determined by the city council of Christchurch to be areas of high risk of tsunami damage. They are also the areas in which public service warnings had alerted the public of possible evacuation on the day of the event. Unnecessary movements into these areas, in the case of an actual breaching tsunami event would have resulted in possible impediment of evacuation from the area for its residents, an impediment of the movement of emergency services into the area, or even provided more individuals for emergency services to rescue in case of entrapment. See figure 2 for the Christchurch city map. The orange highlighted areas are those zones declared by the Christchurch City Council as 'evacuation zones' in the event of a tsunami. These highlighted zones were not included on the map the participants received, but have been added to the presented map for clarification. On the map, the black lines indicate the evacuation routes advised by the Christchurch City Council and the regional Civil Defense department for these evacuation zones. There are limited evacuation routes for these zones.
Of the 20 participants questioned in the study, 3 of 20 (15%) reported going into the high risk zones when the tsunami warning was put into effect on Sunday the 28 th of February. All 3 of these participants reported having changed their travel plains because of the tsunami event. They would not have visited these areas if the event warning had not occurred. They stated they were curious and wanted to inspect for themselves the possible results of the event. The red, blue, and light blue lines on the map in figure 2 represent their respective paths. As can be seen their paths did overlap with evacuation routes.
Although the sample was small, comparisons were made between the 3 participants who entered the risk zones and the 17 participants who did not enter the risk zones for three relevant items to elucidate plausible differences between these people for risk perception and/or tolerance. For the item, "how likely do you think it is that a tsunami could affect Christchurch", responded to on a 1 (definitely not) to 5 (definitely) scale, the 3 risk zone enterers had M = 3.0 (all reported 3) and the 17 non-risk zone enterers had M = 3.3 (SD = 0.9). For the item, "tsunami are too destructive to bother preparing for", responded to on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) scale, the 3 risk zone enterers had M = 1.3 (SD = 0.6) and the 17 non-risk zone enterers had M = 1.7 (SD = 0.9). For the item, "a serious tsunami is unlikely to affect me in the future", responded to on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) scale, the 3 risk zone enterers had M = 1.3 (SD = 0.6) and the 17 non-risk zone enterers had M = 2.9 (SD = 0.8). The later was a statistically significant difference, t(18)= 2.98, p < .01. Figure 2 . Map of the three routes.
In the present study 3 of the 20 participants (15%) reported intentionally driving into the high risk zones after a tsunami warning. While no evacuation order was issued and fortunately the tsunami arrived at Christchurch at low tide, unnecessary movement into potential evacuation zones is problematic. If a real evacuation had been required, people traveling into these zones would have plausibly impaired the evacuation effort, impaired the ability of emergency services to enter the area to help, or even, in the worst case scenario, created more victims of the disaster. Because the sample was one of convenience, it is unlikely to be fully representative of the population of Christchurch. This does confirm media reports of numerous disaster sight-seekers lingering at Christchurch's beaches.
In regards to personal risk perception, the sight seekers actually more strongly felt they may be personally affected by a tsunami in the future than did the non-sight seekers. This may suggest that these individuals were not simply high sensation seekers, looking for a possible thrill, but instead were people who felt threatened by tsunami and wanted more information regarding the event. This would match the findings of Walton and Lamb (2009) which indicates that individual travel after disasters is related to information seeking.
CASE STUDY 2
On September 4, 2010, at 4:35 AM, the city of Christchurch New Zealand was struck by a 7.1 magnitude earthquake. While no one was killed directly by this event and few were injured, there was massive property and infrastructure damage worth billions of New Zealand dollars. After the initial earthquake there were swarm aftershocks with over 100 earthquakes greater than magnitude 2.0 on September 4 and thousands in the months to follow. Anyone of these aftershock quakes could have proven deadly, indeed, on February 22, 2011, the city experienced a 6.3 magnitude aftershock directly under the city which resulted in the deaths of 181 people. The September 4 earthquake and its aftershock events was both stressful and cognitively disruptive (Helton & Head, 2012; Helton, Head, & Kemp, 2011) to the population of Christchurch.
In the present example we surveyed 206 (98 women) people who were in Christchurch from the general public on September 4 2010. The survey was provided to the participants approximately a month after the main earthquake event. In the survey we asked demographic questions, a number of questions regarding the person's response to the earthquake, a short trait measure of the Big Five personality traits (Gosling et al. 2003) , and the participants behavior and intentions. For this discussion we will focus on the relationship between the Big Five personality traits and one of the items asked regarding whether they considered moving to another city or country in response to the earthquake (yes or no). The Big Five personality measure used is a very short variant which mimics longer measures and has good reliability and validity. There were two phrase pairs for extraversion (extraverted, enthusiastic and reserved, quiet); agreeableness (sympathetic, warm and critical, quarrelsome); conscientiousness (dependable, self-disciplined and disorganized, careless); neuroticism (anxious, easily upset and calm, emotionally stable); and openness (open to new experiences, complex and conventional, uncreative). Each pair was followed by a seven-point scale from 1 (disagree strongly that these words or phrases apply to you) to 7 (agree strongly that these words or phrases apply to you). Respondents were asked to consider each pair as "a description of what you are normally like". While we could not rule out the individuals' personality responses were contaminated by a state response, the instruction were to consider them as trait indicators.
Twenty four people (11.7%) reported considering leaving Christchurch in response to the earthquake evens. We then used logistic regression to examine the relationship between the Big Five and this response; we also included gender as the stress response regarding the event had demonstrated strong gender differences . The Nagelkerke pseudo R 2 indicated that the model accounted for 19.6% of the total variance. The total model was significant χ2(6) = 21.78 , p = .001. The only significant Big 5 personality predictor was trait neuroticism, Wald = 3.96, Exp(B) = 1.43, p = .047. Gender was also significant, Wald = 9.30, Exp(B) = 6.77, p = .002. Women were only 42.9% of those not considering leaving Christchurch, but women were 83.3% of those considering leaving Christchurch. All the other predictors were statistically insignificant, p > .05. The difference in neuroticism between those reporting considering leaving the city and those who reported not considering this is displayed in Figure 2 . A primary result of this study is that individual personality appears to influence the intentions to leave a disaster zone or area experiencing a series of unpredictable disaster events. This suggests models which assume people will act homogenously in response to disasters are unrealistic. Individuals do differ in their response to threat or perception of threat and this likely will differentially influence their intentions to withdrawal from a natural disaster.
CONCLUSIONS
In case study 1, some people do not appear to do as Civil Defense authorities request them to do in response to a tsunami. This poses a serious challenge for both disaster managers and traffic modelers. People moving towards a potential oncoming disaster may indeed look from a collective perspective as irrational; however, this movement towards or into affected zones needs to incorporated into disaster plans and simulations. While movement towards of a disaster may appear irrational, it may simply reflect a need for detailed information in some people who may distrust the information they receive second hand.
A plausible solution to this movement into risk zones is to satisfy the disaster information seekers with more or better information, e.g. media coverage which focuses on detailed information and not simply sensationalism. This may discourage disaster sightseekers' information seeking behavior. For example, if mobile units are in the risk or affected areas, streamed video from these units may enable the information seekers to engage in vicarious disaster informationseeking, instead of physically being present.
In case study 2, considerations of leaving a city experiencing a swarm of earthquakes appear to be influenced by individuals' trait neuroticism and gender. While this may be unsurprising to psychologists, these individual differences in responses should be considered in disaster models of human behavior. People are not homogenous agents, but are heterogeneous. A simple improvement in agent models, for example, may be to reflect the distribution of neuroticism in the population and give the agents in the model different tipping points to trigger their flight behavior.
In summary, considering individual differences, in particular differences in the need for information (information-seeking) and differences in the trigger points for the flight responses, may help disaster managers better understand and model the behavior of populations threatened by natural disasters.
